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SECURITY INFORMATION

RADIO MOSCOW'S LINE TO THE SATELLITES  
ON EAST GERMAN DISORDERS

Summary

1. Moscow broadcasts in Satellite languages have carried the essential elements of its line to the Soviet people and to the world at large, which stresses U.S. instigation of the disorders, expresses confidence in the GDR government, registers approval of the conciliatory "new course" aimed at reunifying Germany, indicates that the attempt to obstruct it has failed, and ignores any Soviet involvement either in the disorders or in the "new course." In respect to Western responsibility, this line is less extreme than that developed by East German media, which imply that the disorders were intended to be the first move in forcible annexation of the GDR and the beginning of a third world war.

2. No Moscow propaganda on the East German disorders has been broadcast exclusively to the Satellites. Some subsidiary materials in Moscow's domestic and international services have been omitted from certain Satellite beams (e.g., the Kalkowski confession) or from all of them (e.g., some reviews of U.S. espionage in East Germany.)

3. Satellite media themselves have followed the Moscow lead. Notable variations: a) Rumania and Albania treated the incident most gingerly; b) the Czech radio has been the most thorough, and the only one to note the role of Soviet occupation forces; c) Bulgarian comment adopted the extreme East German line in regard to Western aims in starting the disturbance.

4. Reports of mass protest meetings in the USSR indicate that the Kremlin takes a grave view of the incident; but as far as one can judge from the propaganda patterns, the attack on the United States is primarily face-saving and diversionary, and the East German disorders, while giving rise to domestic counter-measures both conciliatory and repressive, will have no effect on the present Soviet international policy of seeking a sufficient relaxation of tension to permit exploitation of divisive tendencies, chiefly economic, in the West.

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1. The Moscow Line

a. The Soviet propaganda position on the East German disorders is stated in four principle articles, the first three broadcast some 20 - 25 times each, and the final authoritative formulation 54 times.

1) Neues Deutschland editorial 18 June, which takes the position that American and West German policy-makers, dismayed by the GDR's new conciliatory steps toward unity, undertook this desperate measure to disrupt the new course. The provocation failed because the majority of East Berliners saw through it, but the Party must correct the conditions which made possible the deception of a substantial portion of the workers.

2) Confession of Werner Kalkowski, which documents U.S. leadership of the provocation.

3) Pravda editorial 21 June calling for vigilance against U.S. espionage all over the world.

4) Pravda editorial 23 June, which reiterates U.S. instigation of the disorders and cites the Korean prisoner release as a parallel provocation designed to frustrate conciliation, expresses confidence in the GDR government, registers for the first time Soviet approval of the new conciliatory moves of the GDR, acknowledging that they are designed chiefly as a measure toward German unity, and continues to ignore any Soviet involvement in the disorders or in GDR policy.

b. A measure of the seriousness with which Moscow views the German incident is provided by reports of protest meetings held in Soviet factories. This mass agitation device, used fairly frequently in the Satellites, had been reported from the Soviet Union on only four previous occasions since the end of World War II. The four events previously protested were (1) Greek executions in 1949 (2) U.N. entry into the Korean War (3) U.S. use of BW (4) Kije massacre. The current agitation appears to give equal weight to a) indignation at American provocation and b) expression of confidence in the German workers.

c. An indication of possible effects on Soviet foreign policy is contained in the fact that a TASS statement of 18 June that the affair would make progress toward German unity more difficult is suppressed in all subsequent propaganda, which emphasizes that the attempt to hinder progress toward unity has failed. Similarly, on the global scale, the final Pravda article which links the Korean and German provocations gives assurance that all obstacles in the path of peace will be overcome.

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## 2. The Line to the Satellites

a. The four articles cited above as constituting the Soviet line domestically and internationally are also used with some variation in Satellite languages.

1) The Neues Deutschland editorial of 18 June was broadcast to all Satellites except Bulgaria. Perhaps as a consequence, the Budapest radio took its cue from the more extreme 19 June editorial in Neues Deutschland, which ascribed the provocations to Western intent to take over the GDR by force and start a third world war.

2) The Kalkowski confession was heard only in Hungarian and Rumanian of the Satellite languages.

3) The 21 June Pravda editorial calling for vigilance against U.S. espionage was broadcast to all the Satellites; but less authoritative articles of 19 and 20 June on similar themes were not included in any Satellite beam.

4) The Satellites received almost a quarter of the total distribution of the final 23 June Pravda editorial. This proportion is heavier than normal, and constitutes something of an "attention" flag.

b. The Satellites have received no exclusive materials, however, and no Moscow comment on the incident at all since 23 June.

## 3. Satellite Broadcasts

The Satellite home services were slow to comment on the East German disturbances, in general followed the Moscow cue in what they said, and diverted attention from the affair as rapidly as possible. Only the Czech radio's discussion of it gave any impression of the real extent of the disturbances and took note of the part played by Soviet occupation forces in quieting them. The Warsaw Trybuna Ludu, however, is reported to have discussed the Soviet military intervention. Monitored Albanian and Rumanian comment consisted of one item each. Bulgarian broadcasts, as noted above, followed the extreme East German line on Western intentions.